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What Does Mendes-France Want?

New Republic

Outlawing the Communists

EDITORIAL

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Malraux and the Image of Man

AN ESSAY BY JOSEPH FRANK

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T. R. B.

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Washington Wire

Candor compels the admission that the Eisenhower Administration delivered out of the Eighty-third Congress just about the most one might have expected from a self-proclaimed "businessman's administration"—right away.

The corporation executives surrounding the President aren't turn-of-the-century mossbacks. They don't think they can undo all the social gains of the New Deal, bust organized labor, dump deposit-insurance, destroy public power, and go back to the glad old days when the federal government was the handmaiden of the bankers; but they are out to neutralize the social gains. The way they operate is to do it from inside the government rather than from the outside.

It was therefore to be expected that the Eisenhower tax bill should frankly be drafted to "encourage" business by giving most of its tax "relief" to corporations and a handful of big investors—and never mind the purchasing power of the millions of jobholders.

It was to be expected that, while never overtly admitting it in Washington, Secretary McKay and Presidential Assistant Sherman Adams would consistently favor private power. This pattern was followed repeatedly. McKay scuttled the Interior Department recommendation for the Hell's Canyon project and tried to force Georgia co-ops into an unfavorable contract for federal power. Adams, the Budget Bureau and apparently every other Administration figure united to force the Atomic Energy Commission and the Tennessee Valley Authority into contracts—insisted on by the President himself—with the Dixon-Yates syndicate. The Eisenhower people simply aren't going to tolerate any more expansion of TVA or of public power generally.

They are packing the agencies with new members "sympathetic" to their own ideas. They've got control of the Federal Trade Commission and the National Labor Relations Board, among others, and the FTC and NLRB are rewriting the laws without waiting for directives from Congress. The unions won't be busted; life will simply be made harder for them, and the long-needed successful Southern organizing drives will be harassed some more. The anti-trust laws won't be repealed: the FTC and the Justice Department have simply adopted new procedural rules making strict enforcement less to be feared.

It was a little astonishing to find the gimlet-eyed businessmen pushing a major Social Security expansion. Yet one must observe that it took the President a year to make up his mind, that in 1953 he asked Congress to "postpone" a scheduled Social Security tax increase—and finally that even a "businessman's administration" sometimes must listen to politicians. Practically all Republicans on Capitol Hill eventually realized that if they let Democrats carry the ball on expanding Social Security payments, they would supply their opponents with a made-to-order campaign issue.

The Eisenhower crowd got away with plenty as it was—and the beauty, artistically, was that they did it by calling the program "dynamic, progressive," and without giving the Democrats a really apt tagline to identify to the voters what the GOP was really doing.

Economic conditions, come November 2, are still the key. Mr. Eisenhower took occasion in Illinois to lash Sen. Paul Douglas as a "prophet of gloom"—this in addition to giving the kiss of approval to Douglas' Republican rival, the anti-Eisenhower lobbyist Joe Meek.

If a warning word is permitted to the gimlet-eyed businessmen, all their upcoming "surprise" indictments of former New Deal office holders, all their present gloating, all their carefully planned slick advertising and publicity campaign tricks, could be blown up if the economy slips just a little more. The Committee on Economic Trends and Policies of the US Savings and Loan League predicts "a sidewise to moderately downward drift" the rest of the year. As Oliver Goodman, *Washington Post and Times Herald* financial editor puts it, the League's forecasts "have been uncannily accurate in the past."

The Eighty-third was not a do-nothing Congress, and for this the White House deserves some credit. Somebody lashed a whip persistently and effectively over the last two months.

Whether the Democrats can prove that the Eighty-third was a "give-away" Congress—and there were a lot of obscure little "give-aways" in addition to the ones that made black headlines—seems to be up to the Democrats. Lyndon Johnson hinted at this in his close-of-session statement. Former Speaker Sam Rayburn, House Democratic leader, preferred to lay it on the line about economic conditions—and this seems the better bet. People get mad at general "give-aways" in Washington primarily when they are mad about their own circumstances—when their income is sliding, when they don't have jobs, when they realize that they are personally damaged by the "give-aways."

The Republicans are still stuck with McCarthy, of course, but one suspects that they will be able to stage-manage events so as not to create too much of an intra-party row before November 2.

The Mundt subcommittee, with criticisms of both McCarthy and Army Secretary Stevens, will report its puerile findings presumably in September. But no one would expect anything except puerility from a subcommittee headed by the gentleman from South Dakota.

The Watkins subcommittee, to investigate the issue of whether the Senate should reconvene to vote on a motion to censure McCarthy, could conceivably complete its work within a couple of weeks, thus allowing campaigning Senators a chance to get back to Washington. The plain fact is that the GOP doesn't want such a reconvened session before election, and there will be one only if the heat becomes unbearable. There could have been a vote, since the issues are already clear, before Congress went away—if Mr. Eisenhower had insisted on a vote or if Senator Knowland, GOP floor leader, had been willing to permit one.

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Noteworthy This Week

BEHIND THE HEADLINES

President Eisenhower's Record

ON THE DAY Congress adjourned, President Eisenhower opened the portion of the '54 campaign he will direct by claiming a legislative "batting average of .828." To back up that claim the White House chose 64 Presidential requests—ranging from public works projects for the District of Columbia to Foreign Aid appropriations — and showed how Congress had agreed "in some form" to all but eleven. The entire performance revealed the weakness of "the record" Eisenhower is asking Republican candidates to campaign on, and guaranteed that the real fight will be directed by Vice President Richard Nixon and Attorney General Herbert Brownell—gentlemen who learned much from McCarthy before they began deploring the crudity of his methods.

As the *NR* reported on July 26, President Eisenhower has made major proposals in 11—not 64—legislative areas. At that time he had won three—Social Security, the St. Lawrence Seaway and Foreign Aid—and lost three—Hawaiian Statehood, Taft-Hartley Revision and Reciprocal Trade. As predicted, the Administration has claimed a victory on Reciprocal Trade—it requested a three-year extension with increased tariff-lowering authority; it got a one-year extension with no increase in authority. (Since then, the President has requested and won a $6 billion increase in the national debt limit.)

The *NR* listed Farm Supports and Tax Revision as probable Administration victories, and they were. It predicted an Administration defeat on Atomic Energy, Public Housing and the package of Internal Security measures. The White House now claims as victories an Atomic Energy Act which does not implement either of the President's basic requests: (a) greater international atomic co-operation and exchange of information, and (b) greater participation by private industry under conditions of *free competition*. It also claims as a victory the Housing bill which restricts low-cost federal housing to 35,000 units for *one year only* instead of authorizing the 140,000 units over four years as requested.

On internal security, the proposal to strip witnesses before a Congressional committee of the right to invoke the Fifth Amendment was approved, but power to take such action was reserved to Federal judges and not given the Attorney General as the Administration desired. In effect, the Democrats took the anti-Communist program entirely out of the Administration's hands by proposing a bill—opposed by the White House—to outlaw the Communist Party.

So the President has broken even—six wins, six defeats—on important legislation. And very few of the Republican candidates this year backed his program often enough to run on that "record" even if they considered it strong enough to win for them. So Vice-President Nixon—already booked to speak in two-thirds of the states—will carry the "20 Years of Treason" banner around which most Republican candidates will flock. And Attorney General Brownell will — among other things—try hard to resurrect the corruption issue by springing a number of surprise, last-minute indictments against important Democratic office holders. Likely prospects include former Treasury and Justice Department officials as well as a few Congressmen. In the meantime, President Eisenhower will virtuously campaign on the theme of "normalcy." Although pledged to support only those who backed his program, his first speech, at the Illinois State Fair, thumped the drum for that "fine fellow" Joseph Meek, who wants the Senate seat of Paul Douglas, has spoken out against a number of Eisenhower's pet ideas, and warmly admires Joe McCarthy. As for the "Citizens for Eisenhower" they can hardly be more consistent. If the President goes to Meek and such, so must the "Ike Girls," the Red, White and Blue "Ike Bandwagon," the "Ike Barrage Balloon," and the "Citizens" film—"The Year of Big Decision."

Proof and Pudding

"THE paramount fact about the economy at mid-year," intoned the White House aide, "is that the recent decline in economic activity has come to a halt." Proof? The Gross National Product (a statistical device for measuring economic health) after falling steadily since early 1953, rose by $200 million in the second quarter of 1954. And the Federal Reserve Board "Index of Industrial Production" held firm between July and August.

Fair enough. These figures appear in *Economic Indicators,* issued monthly by the President's Council of Economic Advisers. *Economic Indicators,* however, adds a note which neither the White House aide, nor the President, when later



Step Lively, Gents—Next—Okay, Next—

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he described how the dragon of recession had been slain, mentioned. Both statistical series had been revised between July and August. Gross National Product figures for 18 months preceding the second quarter of 1954 had been revised downward, leaving the unrevised figure looking very good indeed against a background of rewritten economic history. Seen against un-rewritten history, instead of gaining $200 million, the GNP for the second quarter of 1954 fell from $357.2 billion to $356 billion. As for the Index of Industrial Production, it did not sink any further because where past practice has been to allow less than one index point for summer vacation-time production, this year 6.2 index points were added to the real figure.

"Certain Other Aspects"

THE BELL has tolled for another round in the Government's fight against Owen Lattimore. The Department of Justice has announced that a new perjury indictment will be sought, to be consolidated for trial purposes with the five counts remaining of the 1952 indictment.

At the same time, the Department has decided not to seek Supreme Court review of the Court of Appeals decision voiding the key count of the 1952 indictment for vagueness. That count alleged that Lattimore lied to the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee when he denied that he had ever been "a sympathizer or any other kind of promoter of Communism or Communist interests." The court found that the word "sympathizer" made the charge unduly vague.

Leo A. Rover, the United States Attorney prosecuting the case, has stated that the new indictment will be sought on the basis of "certain other aspects" of Lattimore's testimony before the subcommittee, aspects which were certainly known or ascertainable at the time the 1952 indictment was secured. These aspects are said to bear on Lattimore's "alleged promotion of Communism and Communist interests—without the word 'sympathy'." Whether the fatal defect of the 1952 charge can be cured by shifting the emphasis from "sympathizer" to "promoter" raises a serious legal issue. And when asked if this is not merely a backdoor way to reinstate the invalid count of the earlier indictment, Rover responded with a "No comment" and a broad grin.

Attlee in Peking

London

ENGLISHMEN are puzzled by what appears as conspiracy between the American and Communist press to present the Labour Party delegation's journey to Moscow and Peking as an event of world shaking importance, presaging a total rupture between Britain and the USA when Labor is returned to power.

Even in Britain some Conservative newspapers have tried to dress up the delegation as treachery to democracy. This line never had much plausibility, especially since Churchill was known to envy the good fortune of his rivals—David Low, the dean of British cartoonists, showed Churchill attempting to stow away in the plane taking Attlee to Moscow! The campaign is now fizzling out. The British Parliament has accepted an invitation from the Supreme Soviet to send an official all-party delegation to Russia this autumn. And a recent opinion poll has shown that even a majority of Tories approve the Labour visit to Moscow, while only twenty per cent of the population disapprove the visit to Peking.

Such doubt as still remains bases itself primarily on the reaction in the United States. Hector McNeil, who served Labour as Minister of State under Bevin, went so far as to describe the delegation as "irresponsible and ill-timed." Very few Labourites should agree with him now, though more might have agreed when the decision to send the delegation was announced—before the settlement at Geneva.

In fact, the Labour Party committed itself to send such a delegation at its annual conference last October. At first Moscow and Peking showed little interest. But when the Chinese made a formal invitation in May, the National Executive was bound to accept it—particularly since it was already fighting an unpopular national campaign in favor of EDC. The composition of the delegation is a guarantee that it will not behave stupidly. To describe Clement Attlee, in the words of *The New York Times*, as an "innocent abroad," shows extraordinary ignorance of his lifelong record as a fighter against Communism; as a shrewd judge of men and movements. And as Attlee himself said on his departure, the visit does not and will not in any way modify Labour's conviction that the American alliance is the cornerstone of British foreign policy.

On the contrary, Labour's demonstrated readiness to respond to the recent improvement in Communist manners will strengthen Attlee's hand when it next becomes necessary to stand firm against Communist policies. And though little news has so far emerged from the delegation, it seems that despite the orgy of hospitality both in Moscow and Peking, political discussion with the Communists was largely confined to very

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general questions and to issues like trade and cultural exchanges which can reasonably be treated as matters for bilateral negotiation. The Communist propaganda machine will naturally squeeze the maximum benefit out of the visit, and will exploit the evidence of a division between Britain and America on the possibility of co-existence. But in the present state of public opinion both in Europe and Asia, the visit is much more likely to strengthen confidence in the West than to weaken it.

The one concrete issue on which the delegation may have some direct effect is of course the forthcoming negotiations for a South East Asia Treaty Organization. It looks as if the British and American Governments have been drawing steadily closer to one another on the relative priorities of defense and economic aid, Western arms and Asian confidence. But since Attlee has already approved negotiations to this end, subject to conditions which the British Government also maintains, here too the delegation is more likely to strengthen the Western position than to weaken it.

Network Satellites

AFTER the weeks of Senate Committee hearings on Ultra High Frequency television (*NR*, July 26), the Federal Communications Commission has issued a policy statement on the matter. From now on "the Commission will consider applications for stations in the UHF band which do not propose to originate any local programs." Furthermore, the FCC will waive its rule forbidding a single owner or operator to control two or more stations serving the same area.

As Commissioner Frieda B. Hennock said in her lone, but vigorous dissent, this ruling will turn UHF outlets into satellites of the entrenched networks, inviting "monopolistic control over TV, the most important medium of mass communications ever devised."

Small UHF stations cannot thrive commercially without network affiliation; local or unusual programs have little chance of finding a place in a schedule dominated by big network shows. This is the UHF dilemma: compete with the networks and go broke or fall into line and lose independence. The FCC ruling may save a few stations from bankruptcy; it will not make for better television.

London Dispatch GOOD NEWS

WHILE the defense of Western Europe continues to wait on EDC or its alternative and the prospects of organizing military security in Southern Asia remain uncertain, progress in Southeast Europe and the Middle East has gathered astonishing momentum in the last few months. Indeed when irritation over Geneva has died down, America and Europe will recognize that their gains in this area far outweigh whatever may have been lost in Indo-China.

The process began last winter when American diplomacy cut the Gordian knot which was strangling British negotiations with the Arabs by persuading Pakistan and Turkey to provide the piers for a new defense structure further to the North. Since then Iraq and Persia have been slowly moving toward participation in this structure. And now, in the space of two weeks, Britain has managed to remove the two great obstacles to her own diplomacy in the Middle East. The agreement with Egypt over Suez has at one stroke freed her hands for a more active policy elsewhere, and created the conditions for more fruitful co-operation with the Arab countries. Moscow's reaction has been significant; on August 8, *Pravda* described the agreement as "threatening the peaceful co-existence of Egypt with other countries" and "a dangerous step toward support of American plans for a Middle East command."

The agreement with Iran on a settlement of the oil dispute is no less important. Britain has made great concessions, but has done a good deal better than might have been expected. The way is now cleared for political and perhaps military co-operation with Persia for Middle East defense.

In the same week France took the first great stride toward settling her quarrels with the Arab world. Mendès-France's bold initiative in Tunisia provides further evidence that, contrary to some opinions, his Premiership is of exceptional value to the Western alliance.

And as if all this were not enough, the long uncertainty about Balkan defense is ended by the new pact between Turkey, Greece and Yugoslavia. Indeed, the new Balkan pact has far more than a military significance—it may provide the best possible means of assimilating Communist Yugoslavia into the European community. And all the evidence suggests that another long-standing danger-spot may be removed shortly through an agreement between Yugoslavia and Italy over Trieste.

Of course all this simply creates the framework which patient diplomacy must now fill in, or even less, the conditions in which diplomacy can be effective. And there are still some difficult obstacles to overcome. France's progress in Tunisia may still be upset by domestic politics or by trouble in Morocco. And Britain's moral gains in Egypt may be offset by losses which endanger relations elsewhere in the Middle East.

It is not easy to defend the British government's handling of the Cyprus problem. Cyprus has long been a British military base and colony, and, now that the Canal Zone is to be evacuated, will become Britain's Middle East Headquarters. The great majority of Cypriots are Greeks who desperately want union with Greece, although they would be glad to keep the British military base on the island. In recent years the Greek government has shown increasing sympathy with Cypriot demands for union. And after repeated British refusals even to discuss the matter, Greece has decided to raise it at the United Nations. Meanwhile Britain has offered a new constitution to Cyprus, strictly on condition that the demand for union with Greece is dropped. And now she has made it a crime for Cypriot newspapers even to reprint British articles which treat the demand for union with Greece sympathetically.

There seems little doubt that this extraordinary and indefensible Blimpishness is intended to pacify the Conservative imperialists who have recently rebelled over Suez. But it is likely that the pressure of British and world opinion may soon compel a change from this squalid and odious posture.

London DENIS HEALEY, M.P.

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Paris Dispatch What Mendes-France Wants

WHEN Pierre Mendès-France arrived in Brussels the day before the start of the 3-day conference he let it be known that he wanted above all to have as quickly as possible a face-to-face (and if humanly possible, heart-to-heart) talk with Konrad Adenauer. He was acutely aware, he confided in his close friends, that the West German Chancellor might have almost as much trouble in getting a compromise on EDC safely through the parliament in Bonn as he himself anticipated having with the National Assembly in Paris. Perhaps he and Adenauer could help each other in a common cause; it was a chance worth taking—and quickly. After all they were both—each in his own way—good Europeans.

Anyway, the Frenchman went on record as believing, the working out and the acceptance of any compromise whatsoever by the five conferees in Brussels depended primarily on whether the heads of the French and German delegations could find a basis for negotiation. For wasn't the heart and core of any workable Western European formula—political and psychological as well as military—the removal of some of the mutual distrust between the French and German peoples, if not the laying of a foundation for affirmative co-operation between them?

For two whole days at Brussels—the first two crucial days—Adenauer pointedly avoided any personal contact with Mendès-France. To make matters clear—and astonishing—a spokesman for the German delegation said that no personal meeting was foreseen because "The conference is taking up European questions and not Franco-German problems" —as though there were a dividing line between the two. And to make matters unpleasant the same spokesman gave out a version of Mendès-France's speech at a "restricted" meeting which the French delegation denied as full of inaccuracies.

The desire of Mendès-France for a personal tour of the horizon with Adenauer seemed sensible. From the domestic French point of view it was daring. While the Brussels conference was in session commemorative ceremonies were being held in Paris of the tenth anniversary of the Liberation of the city. Representatives of all classes and parties joined in mourning at a tragically large number of places in northern France—where the retreating German armies carried out mass massacres of resisters. Ten years is not a long time; relatives and friends of the victims, as well as survivors were present.

The shortness of the time and the horror of the memory help explain why —as Mendès-France said in his final pre-Brussels radio talk to the French people —"the question of EDC touches the deepest fibers of our national feeling," and why the prospect of German rearmament in this generation not only divides Frenchmen among themselves but also within themselves. Yet the Premier went to Brussels to offer a basis for negotiations that would lead to a German rearmament.

The question at issue in Brussels turned out to be not German rearmament but a European army as the springboard for European political federation. Some of the most respected names in France—Auriol, Herriot, Moch, Juin, Weygand, de Gaulle, the Count of Paris (to mention only a few)—are linked with opposition to Germany's rearmament; they join however in opposition to supra-nationality, to a Federated Europe. On this subject there is deep fanaticism on both sides, and not only in France.

It is likely that men of Mendès-France's own country were at least partly responsible for the failure of Adenauer and Mendès-France to meet privately until the talks ended. On the day before the conference opened, Robert Schuman, the former Foreign Minister, and Adenauer's last remaining (now that Alcide de Gasperi has died) "inspirer" of Christian Europe, wrote in the *Figaro* of Paris a front-page article condemning the Mendès-France compromise on EDC and suggesting once again that the original treaty could be adopted at the Palais Bourbon. On the same day, another arch-European, André Philip wrote a similar article in the *Franc-Tireur*.

They were—deliberately or not—torpedoing the chances of success for Mendès-France at Brussels. For they were encouraging to firm and unbending opposition not only Adenauer but the Dutch. And the Belgians (where the equivalent of the parties of Adenauer, Schuman and Bidault remains very strong).

Here in Paris it is hard for an outside observer to believe that Schuman is right in believing that EDC can be adopted at the Palais Bourbon with much less than the Mendès-France "additional protocol" of changes. After all, every single Commission of the Chamber has voted down the law. The three Gaullist Ministers remaining in the Cabinet will almost surely leave if the protocol is rejected or greatly altered. And in general the fanaticism in France against supra-nationalism is greater than that for European Federation.

The role of the US and Britain—and their willingness to participate in as well as to support some community or co-operative entity—is the key to the immediate future. If Britain still wants out, and if the US still wants to have a great deal without paying much, a defeat for Mendès-France or even a bad, drawn battle would very possibly have as its consequence in Paris a swing either to Antoine Pinay or even much farther to the Right.

Mendès-France already has visited Sir Winston Churchill, presumably to explore ways in which British association with some kind of European coalition—looser than the supra-national EDC—could help him bring the French Assembly to grips with the realities of free Europe's defense needs. Washington, unable to forecast the strategy of the mercurial Frenchman, seems content to wait and see how he handles the Assembly during the last week of August, when the EDC debate is scheduled. One thing is clear: Mendès-France has seen to it that his nation and its Assembly know exactly what the situation they face involves.

Paris FRANK GORRELL

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EDITORIAL

Outlawing the Communists

THERE is so much to object to in the Communist Control Act of 1954 that it seems necessary to record at once that the authors of the Act and the editors of this journal start with the same assumptions. The Findings of Fact, which introduce the Act, are themselves an arrogation by Congress of a role that belongs to the Courts. Yet they set forth facts which we believe to be true. We agree that the Communist Party is "an authoritarian dictatorship within a republic." We do not doubt that "its members have no part in determining its goals." We are sure that it is "an agency of a hostile foreign power." And we believe with the authors of the Act that the Communist Party . . .

> is the means whereby individuals are seduced into the service of the world Communist movement, trained to do its bidding and directed and controlled in the conspiratorial performance of their revolutionary duties.

All this is argument why Americans should work as citizens to expose, to isolate, to minimize the Communist Party. This action is not simply negative, in protecting the right of reformism in America to develop along sound lines. It can serve the positive purpose of inducing the Soviet leaders to behave more like Russians and less like Bolsheviks. The alternative to war is the evolution of the Soviet State away from revolutionary doctrines, and this evolution is suppressed while strong Communist Parties overseas provide extremists in the Kremlin with hope in the opportunities for revolution. The shrinking of the Communist Parties can help to bring forward elements within the Soviet ruling group which seek the security of their nation in legitimate relations with other states rather than in their overthrow.

For these reasons, Americans as citizens must combat the Communist Party. Their task has not been made easier by the measure passed in a mood of haste and political maneuver by the Congress in the closing days of the 1954 session. For the sake of doubtful gains in combatting the Communist Party, the great majority of Americans have suffered through a further compromise of the Constitutional guarantees of free speech.

THE ACT first deprives the Communist Party of "the rights, privileges and immunities attendant upon legal bodies created under the jurisdiction of the laws of the United States or any political subdivision thereof." This would seem to mean that the Communist Party can no longer hold bank accounts, make leases and obtain judicial enforcement of contracts; it cannot sue or be sued; it cannot run candidates for public office, at least in federal elections. Is this really a blow at the Communist conspiracy? If it is in truth a conspiracy, its bank accounts are not likely to be made even now in its own name. On the other hand, serious legal precedents are raised to haunt non-Communists as to the extent to which the federal government can deprive an organization of its rights and privileges under state laws. Never before has the United States attempted to dictate to the states what rights they shall grant to organizations that are in full compliance with state laws.

Next, the Communist Control Act subjects anyone who "knowingly and willfully" becomes or remains a member of the Communist Party to all the provisions and penalties of the Internal Security Act of 1950 as a member of a "Communist Action" organization. The provisions of the 1950 Act include registration with the Attorney General. The penalties include a prohibition upon members of the "Communist Action" organizations from holding federal or defense jobs or applying for passports. Violations can result in imprisonment up to five years, in fines up to $10,000, or both. But, again, these are not new restrictions. They are already provided by the Internal Security Act. The new Act states principally that the 1950 Act meant what it said. However, it confuses the 1950 Act by imposing untried statutes on others now four years in the courts. And by introducing new threats of criminal charges, it prepares the way for Communists to cite the Fifth Amendment in refusing to register, a defense prohibited by the 1950 Act.

WHAT is a Communist? The new Act creates 14 criteria for the guidance of "the jury." The criteria may include the posting of a letter, the signing of petitions, the support of a Communist-led union, the passing of any information, knowingly or unknowingly, to a Communist. These criteria are surely unnecessarily broad in the identification of hard-core revolutionaries. But they may well result in punishing the innocent and the unknowing.

The remaining sections of the new law amend the Subversive Activities Control Act of 1950. Only in these sections are new powers conferred on the Executive which the Executive wants, and intends to use.

The new law adds the category "Communist infiltrated" organization to the previous categories of "Communist action" and "Communist front" groups. A "Communist infiltrated" organization is one "substantially dominated or controlled" by individuals who have

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aided the Communist movement. The thrust is at Communist-led trade unions, and once they are found to fall within the category, they are deprived of all relationships with the National Labor Relations Board.

Once again it is worth asking—what is the objective—and is it best achieved by measures of this kind?

THE objective is to dismantle the hard core of Communist-led unions, and it is one which has steadily advanced without legislative assistance. There were nine such unions in 1949 with a membership of one million. Operating without the lever of the law, non-Communists in the labor movement have reduced their strength today to six unions with about 250,000 members. The United Electrical Workers is down from 500,000 in 1949 to 100,000 and is steadily losing out to its CIO rival. The Mine, Mill and Smelter Workers Union has less than 50,000 members and is challenged by the CIO Steelworkers. Only the International Longshoremen's Association ,with 50,000, remains steadfastly loyal to Harry Bridges. And in this one case legislation may backfire for Bridges may well be strengthened by government intervention against his union.

It is true that Communist leadership in these unions has died hard. To hasten its death, the non-Communist oath was written into the Taft-Hartley Act. Its legality was upheld by the courts, but the provision proved largely useless. Communist leaders formally relinquished their outward ties to the Party. The National Labor Relations Board found no way of determining the validity of the non-Communist affidavits they submitted.

It was to remedy this situation that legislation was brought forward by Senator Butler which formed the basis of the present law. The men who have driven the Communists out of organized labor believed without exception that the Butler Bill was essentially a threat to themselves. And while the Senator could point justifiably to the fair record of the fact-finding agency, the Subversive Activities Control Board, it is true that the criteria he set for determination of Communist-domination were vague. As against the immediate gains of his measure in bringing new pressures to bear on the few remaining Communist-led unions, the general dangers implicit in his bill were emphasized by the minority of the House Un-American Activities Committee to whom the bill was referred:

> This bill is a step toward government licensing of trade unions. Such a step should be taken only after the most careful consideration and the clearest demonstration of necessity.

It was to head off the Butler Bill that Senator Humphrey introduced his amendment to outlaw the Communist Party. In the mood of 1954, as he might have foreseen, the end result of his intervention was to get both his own bill and the Butler Bill in a somewhat softened form. Together they are now combined in the Communist Control Act. And we doubt if anyone is safer. There were dangers in the Butler Bill. Like all subversive control bills it vested in government powers which can be misused. Yet most Americans who do not believe that unions are above the law might prefer to live with the risks with the Butler Bill than to add to them the certainties of the new law of which it now forms a part. For this outcome the country must thank Senator Humphrey, Senator Morse and others who sponsored the Humphrey Bill.

The bill which Humphrey produced was first drafted as a substitute to the McCarran Act of 1950. The same Senators tried then to sell it to President Truman, but he rejected it with indignation. This year Lyndon Johnson welcomed it on behalf of the Democratic Party. The few voices that were raised in opposition to the bill echoed the view of a policeman, J. Edgar Hoover, that it was impracticable. In principled terms only Sen. Estes Kefauver and Representatives Multer and Burdick raised the basic issues of the Constitutional guarantees of free speech.

Why did the remaining Democrats surrender the principle? The answer was best given by Senator Humphrey:

> I am tired of reading headlines about being "soft" toward Communism. I am tired of reading headlines about being a leftist and about others being leftists. I am tired of having people play the Communist issue as though it were a great overture which had lasted for years. I want to come to grips with the Communist issue. I want Senators to stand up and to answer whether they are for the Communist Party or are against it. The proposal in the Amendment will place Senators right on the line.

Of course Senator Humphrey is tired—and embattled in the current campaign. But neither fact is justification for saddling the nation with restrictive laws. Nor is outrageous oratory from the Republicans reason for similar oratory from the Democrats in holding that anyone who opposed the Humphrey amendment is "for the Communist Party."

Sam Rayburn summed up the issue when Congress adjourned. "They cannot say anything new about 20 years of treason because we were the ones who led the fight to have an effective anti-Communist bill." By the same logic Mr. Sam could have deprived the Republicans of the globaloney charge by leading the Democrats to oppose every cent of foreign aid.

THE SAD truth is that the Democrats were running after a wraith called public opinion, no longer leading as they were elected to lead, but blindly following the election returns of two years before. They were weak in judgment, in miscalculating the course of public opinion. Far more important, they were weak in spirit—lacking wholly the greatness of LaFollette and Norris who made public opinion; who had the courage of their convictions and dared to tell people the truth.

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The United States and India

The Parting of the Ways

A report from New Delhi explains why Nehru will be "less neutral" towards China

by G. S. Bhargava

NEW DELHI

EVEN the shrewdest strategist in the Kremlin could not have planned the present state of estrangement in Indo-American relations. It is no exaggeration to say that the two countries are now working at cross-purposes: America at "containing Communism" and India at isolating America from independent Asian opinion and confining US influence to its "cohorts," as Pakistan, Thailand, Kuomintang China and South Korea are called here.

The Indo-China agreement at Geneva was acclaimed here as much for the rebuff it meant to American diplomacy as for the part India played in bringing it about. Since then the contrasts in the reactions of Washington and Delhi to the Asian outlook after Geneva are broad and deep. The cold reception accorded to Mr. Dulles' proposal for a Southeast Asian Treaty organization—on the lines of NATO—is the crowning point in the Indo-American parting of the ways. Mr. Nehru, no doubt, expressed his opposition to SEATO as soon as Mr. Dulles mooted it last April, but the last three months have seen not only a hardening of India's attitude but also positive efforts by Mr. Nehru to checkmate US plans.

At the South Asian Prime Ministers' Conference in Colombo last April, Pakistan tried to force some recognition of the merit in the Dulles approach through a resolution on Communist threat to the Asian countries. Ceylon seconded the move, while Burma was not averse to expressing the determination of the Colombo powers to resist any Communist attack. Only India, backed by Indonesia, opposed the resolution. But India was able to ultimately scotch Pakistan's efforts by bracketing Communism with "anti-Communism," an euphemistic reference to the US State Department. The resolution, as finally adopted by the Colombo Conference, upheld what is called the neutralist Third Force idea, the brain-child of Indian Socialists, by calling on Asian nations to steer clear of the two power blocs.

That was far from the Dulles view of Asia's role in the common defense effort. But since Colombo, Mr. Nehru has gone even further. His new position is that India will be "less neutral" towards some Powers, notably China, than toward others. The Colombo Declaration did not preclude such shifts in policy on the part of its signatories. Thus Pakistan is today ready to join the SEATO, notwithstanding its earlier endorsement of the theory that Communism and "anti-Communism" were equal threats to the independence of non-Communist Asian nations. So the façade of unity achieved at Colombo is giving way as Asian nations go their own ways.



Dulles, Nehru, Stassen



Nehru and Chou, with friends

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For two years in which Republican America has been "getting tough" with the Communists, India has been moving closer to Communist China. At the Delhi Conference of Asian nations in 1948—the parleys which ultimately paved the way for the independence of Indonesia—the Prime Minister of Burma, U Nu, suggested an alliance between India, Burma and Indonesia. It was to be a kind of a bloc, the nucleus of a Third Force, coordinating policies on economic, political and defense matters. Both Burma and Indonesia were under Socialist leadership at the time, and Mr. Nehru always had the reputation of being a socialist, notwithstanding the record of his Government at home.

MR. Nehru was not enthusiastic about the Burmese proposal but he was prepared to join the group if U Nu pressed his point. Later, after the Chinese occupied Tibet, the Burmese Premier repeated his proposal in somewhat more urgent tones. Mr. Nehru then took the position that any such *entente* of India, Burma and Indonesia might give China the impression that they were lining up against her and might provoke hostility.

Meanwhile, in Indonesia the fluid political situation has taken a favorable turn for the Communists, who have become once more an important factor although they do not hold office. The present regime in Jakarta is today an ally of the Communists, as far as any proposal for a non-Communist alliance is concerned. And Indonesia's unwillingness to speak or work against the Communist ideology is shared by Nehru, who believes, apparently, that a Communist state can be depended upon to honor its pledges of non-interference in the internal affairs of other sovereign nations.

Burma does not share these illusions but she cannot afford to remain isolated from India and other independent Asian nations. Thus, any proposal for a Southeast Asian alliance, even if sponsored by Burma and free of US or other Western influence will run into formidable opposition. Mr. Nehru now holds that China must be included in any such arrangement.

Diplomatic Conversation

In this connection, it is learned that during the recent New Delhi talks between the Indian and the Chinese Prime Ministers, Mr. Nehru originally thought in terms of a multinational non-aggression pact between China, India, Burma, Indonesia and other Asian nations—a Southeast Locarno, as it was called. But Mr. Chou En-lai seemed to favor bilateral arrangements. Ultimately, Mr. Nehru veered round the latter idea, on the ground that a multi-national alliance might look like a bloc, which it was not his intention to create or promote.

This shift in India's attitude towards China in particular and the Communist world in general is evidently the upshot of the US decision to give military aid to Pakistan. Further, the US made the shift domestically acceptable to Indian conservatives. The Prime Minister was able to fortify himself against internal political attack by making use of the unofficial Congress Party platform to campaign against the arming of Pakistan with US weapons.

The country was behind him on this issue, a fact, which Nehru thought, would dissuade America from helping Pakistan militarily. He was wrong. Whether it be for considerations of prestige or for strategic reasons, the State Department stuck to its decision.

Mr. Nehru's views on US-Pakistan military relations seem to be widely shared in other Asian countries. He argues that the balance of power in Asia has been upset by this alliance of Pakistan and the US, and so, to restore the balance he has been visualizing non-aggression pacts with China.

Independent observers feel that while America is free to choose her friends and enemies, she should have profited by the West European experience and stopped propping up unpopular regimes and obsolete and anachronistic economies, as a means of combating Communism. For in the Indian view, whether in terms of social legislation or economic development, Pakistan is today lagging behind every other Asian country.

In the circumstances, many Asians feel, America should have helped the economic development of Pakistan and thus cut the ground out from under the feet of Communists, instead of building up its military strength. For the US to have picked Pakistan, therefore, as a "chosen instrument" appears highly unwise. The experience of East Bengal further suggests that the US ought not to depend, as she seems to have been doing in Pakistan, on Islamic loyalty as a permanent, effective barrier to Communism.

Mr. Nehru's second objection to SEATO is that any American-sponsored defense organization will be a springboard for attack on China rather than a defensive apparatus against Communist aggression. In support of his contention, Mr. Nehru points out that American allies in the Far East, South Korea and Kuomintang China, have been openly advocating an armed crusade against Communism and are openly demanding a military showdown with China. He fears that the support by SEATO might lessen America's sense of restraint, and thereby encourage those who want war.

Clearly, Mr. Nehru's views on co-existence are different from even those of Britain. In effect, they would

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accept Communist professions of peace at their face value. Mr. Nehru does not believe that the phase of "peaceful co-existence" is a period of armed peace, which is perhaps intermediate to cold war and shooting war. On the contrary, he looks upon co-existence as a transition to peace. Therefore, in his view, there is no necessity for defense arrangements and armaments.

Finally, Mr. Nehru sees the "vestiges of Western colonialism" in Asia as germs of conflict and chaos. He does not view the Communist variety of colonialism with the same distaste. His analysis of the Indo-China situation was typical of this approach. Nehru maintained that the Viet Minh movement was essentially a nationalist upsurge and he was not prepared to concede that the Communists had come to dominate it. In fact, at the Colombo Conference, Mr. Nehru and his chief adviser, Mr. V. K. Krishna Menon, suggested the immediate withdrawal of French troops from Indo-China.

The Burmese Prime Minister then intervened to say that from his first-hand experience of Communist insurrectionary tactics he could guarantee that creation of power vacuum in an area meant writing it off to the Communists. Thereupon, the clause urging the transfer of power from the Quai d'Orsay to Viet Nam, Cambodia and Laos, prior to withdrawal of French troops, was inserted in the Indo-China resolution.

Burmese objections to SEATO are entirely on different grounds. For although Burma is against alignment with either of the two major power blocs, at the same time she is not blind to the Communist danger across the border. But with a militarily strong China as a neighbor and Communist insurgents active all along the 800-mile China-Burma frontier, any action by Burma which might be interpreted as involvement in the big power conflict can provide a pretext for Communist insurrection, which is bound to receive assistance from China. That is why Burma thought in terms of an India-Burma-Indonesia *entente,* which would have had a restraining influence on Peking without at the same time provoking it into active belligerency.

At the Colombo Conference, Burma also suggested an economic arrangement whereby the five Colombo Powers would co-operate with one another in their respective development programs. But, like the earlier proposal for a defense arrangement, this plan was also shelved.

From the standpoint of Asian solidarity, the defeat of Burma's plan was unfortunate. For the post-war years have seen a steady decline in the trade of these Asian countries with Europe. The percentage of their imports from Europe dropped from 32.3 in 1949 to 30 in 1952. In the case of exports, the fall was from 32 percent in 1949 to 29 percent in 1952. At the same time, inter-regional trade among these countries increased from 32 percent in 1949 to 36 percent in 1952. Inter-regional



Chou in Burma

imports have remained steady at 35 percent. Possibilities of improvement in this direction are vast, for, barring India and Burma, the other countries are not making full use of the trading opportunities within the region.

All these countries are currently engaged in formulating and implementing development schemes. For these plans to be successful, the primary problem of food, wherever it is acute, must be tackled. In no other sphere of activity would mutual co-operation among these countries have been so fruitful and necessary as in solving the food problem and in achieving food self-sufficiency through reciprocal Asian trade rather than through unilateral efforts.

Exchange of experience and technical personnel on a regional basis are also badly needed. The economic unity these measures would have created would have provided the basis for political joint action also. But these steps are so unobtrusive and slow that neither the Colombo Powers nor their well-wishers are attracted to them.

As for SEATO, when it is launched next month—at the conference between the US, Great Britain, France, New Zealand, Australia, Thailand and the Philippines—will start with a psychological disadvantage as a result of the non-co-operation of principal Asian nations. If, in addition, the Peking regime launches the "liberation" of Formosa, and America, one of the SEATO partners, intervenes on behalf of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, SEATO will be involved directly in a big power conflict, at the moment of its inception. Least among the consequences will be a further alienation of independent Asian opinion from SEATO.

On the other hand, the Chinese may blunder, and choose Thailand or Nepal for "liberation,"—for they are also on the list. In that event, if SEATO rushes to the aid of the victim without enlarging the area of conflict, then SEATO will receive unexpected support.

G. S. Bhargava writes frequently on Indian Affairs for the NR *and other magazines.*

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Satellite Overtures to Tito

Soviet "Sweet Talk" in the Balkans

by Alexander Kendrick

BELGRADE

On the same day, recently, two airplane incidents occurred on the Hungarian-Yugoslav frontier. A Belgian civilian transport plane, carrying breeding pigs and other cargo to Belgrade, was shot up over Yugoslav territory by a Soviet MIG from Hungary. The normal procedure would have been for Marshal Tito's government to protest the violation of its air space by a foreign military craft, and in the past such protests have been made frequently and regularly. This time Belgrade did nothing, and even went so far as to deny that the incident had taken place within its jurisdiction. A few days later it was learned that the reason for Belgrade's unusually reticent behavior was another plane, a Yugoslav fighter which had had to make a forced landing in Hungary the same morning. In order to get back their own plane without complications, the Yugoslavs had washed their hands of the Belgian plane.

This is typical of the changed state of relations between Tito's government and the neighbors which six years ago expelled it from the Cominform bloc. These relations cannot be called fully normal yet, but they are on the way to becoming so, and meanwhile the Yugoslavs, as with the Belgian plane, are doing nothing to complicate matters. In fact, Tito's present policy toward the Cominform might well be called the policy of "no complications."

On his current visit to Yugoslavia, this correspondent asked for permission to enter the region along the Roumanian border. It was refused, although such permission has been a routine matter for years. Two days later it was announced that Yugoslavia and Roumania had opened negotiations for the resumption of rail traffic between the two countries after a five-year hiatus. Obviously the presence of an American in the border zone might have offended the Roumanians, and thus complicated matters.

There are numerous other examples of rapprochement in Central Europe. This summer, for the first time in six years, a Yugoslav excursion steamer came up the Danube from Belgrade to Vienna, its capacity crowd of Yugoslav citizens passing through Hungarian and Czech waters without visas, or hindrance of any kind. The Danube itself has been reopened as an international waterway by a new state of affairs on the Danube River Commission. After five years of open hostility toward the Yugoslav members from the Roumanian, Bulgarian, Hungarian, Czech and Soviet colleagues, the commission has elected a Yugoslav as secretary, instead of the perennial Russian, and at the last meeting, held in June in Budapest, Yugoslav proposals for regulating Danube navigation were adopted, and all the delegations agreed on a program of works and improvements covering the next five to seven years. Last winter Yugoslavia and Roumania broke the Danube ice literally by jointly blasting the formidable frozen barrier in the Iron Gates section of the river. This summer, during the disastrous Danube flood, a joint Yugoslav-Hungarian commission was formed to supervise anti-flood operations in the frontier area.

DURING the past year the Yugoslavs have re-established full diplomatic relations with Moscow, Sofia, Budapest, Tirana and Bucharest, in that order, and have participated in joint commissions with all their neighbors, marking their common borders and investigating border incidents.

With the resumption of diplomatic relations, all the Cominform countries except Poland and Czechoslovakia now have ambassadors and ministers back in Belgrade, and what is more interesting, military attachés as well. A recent Yugoslav Army field trip was the first on which satellite attachés were taken, and on their return some Western attachés reported that the Russians and other Cominform representatives had received what seemed to them preferential treatment. But a Yugoslav military officer explained matters. "We have to be more friendly to the Cominformists because there's such a long unfriendly time to make up for," he said. "And remember that we are the hosts and have to be polite. Last time we took the Soviet military attaché on our maneuvers, in 1948, he showed us around."

As part of the normalization of relations, the *Cominform Journal* has ceased the more obvious attacks on the Tito government that used to feature every issue, and the Hungarian, Roumanian, Bulgarian and Soviet news agencies now refer to Tito in proper fashion as the Yugoslav chief of state, instead of calling him "traitor," "butcher," "Judas" or "imperialist agent." In return, Radio Belgrade's propaganda has been divested of its more blatant anti-Cominformism.

Alexander Kendrick reports from central Europe for Columbia Broadcasting System.

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Even economic relations between Yugoslavia and the Soviet bloc are beginning to be restored. Although both sides were careful to point out that it was not between governments but between nationalized concerns, a barter agreement for two and a half million dollars worth of goods was signed in May between Yugoslavia and Hungary. This was the first business done between Tito and the satellites since 1949, when the Soviet bloc instituted an economic blockade of Yugoslavia with the intention of causing complete collapse. The blockade almost succeeded in its purpose and would have done so without economic assistance to Yugoslavia from the West. Now the Orient Express can once more run through both Yugoslavia and Bulgaria on its way to Istanbul, and normal railway communications are being restored between Belgrade and the Cominform capitals.

All these things add up to a considerable change in Central Europe since Stalin's death, and they have caused speculation about Tito's intentions and raised the question whether Yugoslavia might re-enter the Soviet sphere of influence. Tito himself has made it clear on several occasions that it will not, and that restoration of correct relations is not the same thing as friendship. Normal relations, he emphasized, did not mean the resumption of the abnormally close relations that existed before the Cominform break.

Moreover the record shows plainly that whatever normalization has been achieved has not been exactly easy. Although Moscow made the first peace overtures a year ago by proposing the exchange of ambassadors, it was left to the satellites to follow up with more concrete armistice terms. The first of these was a Roumanian offer to regulate frontier incidents; it was immediately evident that the Roumanians were most reluctant to make their offer and that they were acting on direct Soviet orders. For the Roumanians, like the other satellites, blame Tito to a large extent for the increased Soviet pressure they have had to bear since Tito's defection, and left to themselves they would not have made any advances to Belgrade.

The Albanian talks were the most important of the series, because they mean the lifting of Yugoslavia's counter-blockade of Albania. The Soviet Union's smallest satellite has been cut off from the rest of the Cominform bloc except by sea or a roundabout air route, and any approximation of normal relations with Yugoslavia will permit not only the resumption of the Moscow-Belgrade-Tirana air line but also air and overland communication with Bulgaria, Roumania and Hungary, via Yugoslavia.

But the most interesting thing about the Albanian negotiations with Yugoslavia was the fact that the Albanians at the same time made a similar approach to Greece, and finally, after some pleading, won an agreement from Athens to a joint border commission. Meanwhile Bulgaria, which had followed the Soviet Union in reopening a diplomatic mission in Belgrade, also laid diplomatic siege to the Greeks.

On May 27 the two countries, bitter enemies for years even before Cominform days—the worst possible insult in Greece is to call a man a Bulgarian—agreed to resume diplomatic relations for the first time since 1914. The Bulgarians then turned their attention to Turkey and proposed the normalization of equally disrupted relations, while the Roumanians became next to woo the Greeks.

THIS sequence of events, over a period of a year, make clear the basic purpose of Cominform sweet talk in the Balkans. For Yugoslavia, Greece and Turkey are all members of the year-old Balkan Pact, and it was as this understanding came closer and closer to a full-fledfied military alliance that the "peace and friendship" campaign of the satellites became more and more insistent under Russian guidance.

Even the Yugoslavs, who originally laid the Cominform overtures to Stalin's death and Malenkov's desire for relaxed tensions, now admit that Moscow's principal purpose is to weaken the Balkan Alliance by making it appear to be unnecessary. For the alliance is primarily a defensive arrangement which by geography is completely operational only against Bulgaria, bordering on all three Balkan partners, or against Albania, encircled on land by two of them.

The relation of the Balkan Alliance to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization is still not wholly clear, and the extent of Yugoslavia's obligations to Greece and Turkey if they enter hostilities under NATO is a moot point. Also to be decided in the future is the question of Italian adherence to the Balkan Pact after the settlement of the Trieste dispute.

But all these things concern the Cominform less than the meaning of the Balkan Pact for the Balkans. It is interesting to note that while other anti-Tito propaganda has slackened off in the Cominform press and radio, the volume and tone of Cominform attacks against the Balkan Pact and Tito's key role in it have not diminished, but increased.

The Cominform's apprehensions concerning the tripartite Balkan Alliance has a threefold basis. First of course is the purely military aspect, for the alliance ties together three large and relatively efficient armies in the strategic southeastern cockpit of Europe.

It is now expected by Western military observers in Belgrade that the Cominform will shortly announce its own Balkan military alliance, consisting of Bulgaria, Roumania and Albania, as a counterwieght to the Belgrade - Athens - Ankara arrangement. This illustrates the dilemma with which necessity has confronted Moscow. On the one hand, it must conduct a campaign of relaxation to prove that the Balkan Pact is unnecessary, and on the other it must, if only for propaganda purposes, create its own Balkan alliance and thus undo

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whatever relaxation may have been induced. As a matter of fact, the normalization of relations in the Balkans has its undoubted dangers for the Russians, especially in the case of Albania, so far away from Moscow, so close to Belgrade.

Albania is the second factor in the Cominform attempt to weaken the Balkan Pact. The original Athens meeting of the three Balkan partners ended with a communique declaring that "Albania's independence constitutes the most important element of peace and stability in the Balkans." This is partly psychological warfare and partly the result of firm Yugoslav conviction that given a normalization of relations and relaxation of tension, it may be possible to lure Albania away from the Cominform. It was no mere gesture of brotherly affection, it seems, that sent a Soviet cruiser and two destroyers to the chief Albanian seaport of Durazzo during the recent election weekend, on the first trip of Soviet warships from the Black Sea through the Dardanelles since the war. The first thing the new Albanian Premier Mehmet Shehu did on taking office July 21 was to announce that the Albanian army would be strengthened, and denounce the Balkan Pact as "a danger for Albania and for the world." At the same time he offered friendlier relations to Yugoslavia and Greece. It was a clear reflection of Moscow's two-edged policy.

But the most weighty motive for the Soviet peace offensive in the Balkans lies in Moscow's traditional suspicion of any Balkan cohesion movement. Even though it would have been under Soviet auspices, the Russians prohibited the projected Balkan Federation between Tito and Dimitrov after the war, and forced the late Bulgarian leader to make abject public recantation of the plan, while Tito's part in it was the beginning of his downfall in the Cominform.

Moscow has always been fearful of movements in the Balkans, so it can be imagined how it regards a Greece-Turkey-Yugoslavia alliance which is not merely a matter of military convenience, but the closest thing to a federation possible under the Western system. For the Balkan Alliance—a monarchy, a republic, and a Communist "democracy"—includes a common consultative Assembly, consisting of 20 parliamentary deputies from each of the three partner states, who will discuss questions not only relating to the pact, but of general regional interest. The pattern for this body is the Scandinavian Assembly, a joint project representing the governments and parliaments of Norway, Sweden, Denmark and Iceland. The Scandinavian Assembly has acted as co-ordinator in the fields of transportation, social welfare, culture and the like. It has no real executive power, but on the other hand it represents no military alliance, so the potentialities of the Balkan Assembly are infinitely greater, great enough at any rate to warrant Soviet alarm that it may play a unifying role in an area that has been synonymous with disunity.

Wabash Avenue

by Emanuel Feldman

WABASH AVENUE is a quiet street in mid-Atlanta, Georgia, a street of well-mowed lawns, dogwood trees which bloom with a sudden whiteness each April, of neat houses with sloping red and blue asphalt roofs, of many birds which in the springtime sing from dawn until night. Cars are parked in front of most of the lawns: a '51 Plymouth, a few Chevrolets, an old Buick, one or two newer Fords.

The residents of Wabash Avenue are two Greek families with many children, a woman recently widowed, an immigrant Jewish couple which owns a grocery store downtown, an elderly native-southerner Baptist lady who lives alone, several middle-aged couples, a minister. Most own their own homes. The street is clean, residential, and white.

But beginning one block south of Wabash Avenue, Negroes, seeping from the bottled crowdings of their south-side settlements, have in the past few years expanded their traditional boundaries northward. At Wabash Avenue they stopped, and the friendly folks on Wabash have since been living in a suspended state of hush and whisper.

IN August, most of the talk on the hot summer nights, on the Wabash Avenue porches lit by yellow anti-bug lights, through the polite tinkling of iced-tea glasses and Coca-Cola, was about Mrs. Wasser, the recent widow. Some had heard that she was selling out to Negroes. "And why not," someone asked, "she's alone and she wants to move and she has to sell to *someone*." Someones, it was obvious, were hard to find, for Wabash Avenue had become a no-man's land, with whites afraid to buy houses there because of the proximity to Negroes, and Negroes afraid to buy there because it was still white territory. And yet they felt that the widow, if the rumors were true, was somehow betraying the rest of the block. "If she has to move, why can't she rent to white folks?"

Rumors soon became facts. A "For Sale" sign appeared early the next month on her lawn. It bore the

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name of an obscure real estate agent. Scrupulous tracing by neighbors showed that he was colored. A similar sign soon appeared on the lawn next door, also with a colored name. At first there was disbelief that such things could be done, then deep resentment, then wishful waiting: it could never happen here on Wabash, no matter what; the neighborhood has to be zoned for colored before they can move in; even if a Negro does buy a home, he'll probably rent to whites; it's the northern interests who are buying the houses for them just to muddy the waters, but they can't move in just like that; and so on. But that same month it was said that Negro real estate agents had been ringing many doorbells, inquiring.

In the pale light of the late October afternoons the menfolks raked leaves into tiny hills in the gutters, leaned on their rakes and chatted. They were certain that the colored would never go through with it. They had heard that the banks were being very careful with their loans, and that the prices asked for the houses were too high for the Negroes. A week later, however, signs appeared suddenly on four of the neat lawns. And in the evening as the men burned the leaves, large red letters on the signs were visible through the smoke. They were not real estate signs. They said:

This is WHITE Property
Not For Sale.

In December it was said that some of the white property owners had been visited by Negro prospects who were admitted through back doors at night. This was denied. In January, Mrs. Wasser was seen showing several Negroes through her home. In February she moved. And on a sunny day in March a small green delivery truck stopped in front of the empty house, a Negro and his wife stepped out, and from the back of the truck four children came whooping. Slowly, systematically, they began moving in their furniture.

It was noontime, few people were at home. Those who were pulled aside crisp white curtains and from their darkness stared blankly. The two older boys were soberly helping with the furniture, and the little girls, beribboned kinks jouncing, jumped in the garden, rolled in the grass, leaped around the house, touching, exploring, shrieking. Their father shushed them.

Across the street the signs stubbornly protested, This is WHITE Property Not For Sale. But their bold redness was faded now from the winter. Only the large WHITE was clearly seen, and even that would be washed away with the next good rain.

Negroes have now been living on Wabash Avenue for several months, but there have been no incidents. The white folks on Wabash are quiet, they do not throw bombs. A fire did break out one night in one of the houses which was about to be sold to another Negro, and the owner, asleep, was asphyxiated, and swiftly the rumors flew that the fire had been deliberate, that it was arson, and some said that it served him right for selling out, and the people clucked their tongues and said, You never can tell what will happen. But the fire chief came with the insurance adjustor, they inspected, they found nothing wrong, and people forgot about it. Bombs there have been none; of talk there has been an abundance. When neighbor says hello to neighbor the inevitable question is: "Are you moving or are you staying?"

"I don't know," most will answer, "I put a lot of money into my house."

One or two, unlike their signs, are still spirited. They will stick it out. They feel it's a shame the street going colored, such a nice street, too. They hope the neighbors stick together and nobody moves. They like Negroes, don't misunderstand, and they know the Negroes have to move someplace, but it's a shame that it has to be Wabash.

But everybody else is not so resolute. They are deeply troubled. They greet the Negro on the street when they see him and they are polite, but as he walks on they pause and look back at him and are puzzled because he seems so refined and well behaved; his house is immaculate, the grass is cut, and the roses this summer seem to have splashed forth even more ferociously red on the bushes of his lawn.

To SOME it is a religious problem. They come to the minister for guidance. They sit in his study and one woman blurts out desperately,

> What should we do, what should we do? We feel we have to move, but is it right for us to go? They're God's creatures too . . . I suppose in heaven there won't be no special section for colored. But . . . you see I was raised in a small town in south Georgia. I lived around them all my life and I know what it's like. Right now they're quiet and all, and clean, but you just wait and soon they'll be all over the street and noisy and dirty and all. I want to do the right thing.

The minister replies that one must do what one thinks is right and that the decision must be made with one's self.

The woman's sign is now gone and she is moving. The Negro to whom she is selling, she says, is extremely nice, well mannered, and clean.

And so it goes. It is only a matter of time. The Greek families with their children, the minister, the immigrant Jewish couple, the widows, even the one or two who are spirited—all will go. Slowly, gradually, like sand seeping from a clenched fist, they will move, and Wabash will go colored.

The next street above us is Angier Avenue. We must go and visit the white folks on Angier. Find out how they're getting on.

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GERALD W. JOHNSON

★

The Superficial Aspect

SINCE the day when governments were first established among men, the basic requirements of statecraft have been two in number—courage and intelligence. His bitterest enemy will hardly deny that Senator McCarthy has the nerve of a Moro *juramentado* hopped up to the eyebrows; if he had ability in the same measure he would be a statesman of the first order. But with only one of the two requisites he survives, and in the present situation the explanation is not far to seek; it is in the maxim *unoculus inter caecos* —"in the realm of the blind a one-eyed man is king."

That the courage of the Republican Senate is monopolized by the ancient Flanders is attested by the roaring farce of the Pussyfoot Panel established under Senator Watkins. The original Flanders resolution asked for information, not about McCarthy, but about the Senate, to wit, what is its opinion of the public activities and attitudes of Senator McCarthy? What the Senator may have done furtively and under cover did not enter; the question was as to the Senate's attitude toward McCarthy as he is known to all the world.

SUMMONED to testify as to its own opinion the Senate answered in effect that it doesn't know enough about the Senator to form an opinion and set up a committee to seek information. That is to say, it availed itself of its constitutional privileges to avoid answering, for all the world like a "fifth-amendment Communist." The cream of the jest is that this is the same Senate that has been citing ordinary citizens for contempt when they refuse to answer questions far less legitimate than the one that Flanders posed.

However, this is an election year, and poltroonery among politicians in an election year need startle nobody. What is startling is the complete lack of political intelligence in the majority.

Time and again observers adhering to neither party warned both the President and Congressional leaders that McCarthy's real objective was mastery of the Republican party, but they would not believe it. Probably few of them ever believed that McCarthy was doing any material damage to the Communists, but they did hope that he was doing great damage to the Democrats by pouring vituperation on such figures as Acheson, Marshall and Truman. Not until that bawdy television burlesque did they realize that he has no more respect for the rights and dignity of the Party than he had for those of Lattimore and Oppenheimer, and by that time it was too late.

McCarthyism has contributed greatly to driving a Republican President from leadership, not only of his party, but of the free nations of the world. McCarthyism has helped drive the State Department into such a nervous collapse that at Geneva it suffered a paralytic stroke and had to transfer to Eden and Mendès-France. McCarthyism has driven the army into such a state that an ordinary line officer hardly dares venture the opinion that a sheep has been sheared except on the side he can see. McCarthy and Flanders between them have compelled the Senate to crawl under the bed. Knout in hand, McCarthy stands dominant over Washington, and anyone who thinks that is good for the Republican party is leaving out of account the sense of humor of the American people.

ONE PHASE of the situation that is serious for the party, although productive of giggles among the unregenerate, is the fearful strain the situation has thrown upon the one-party press. It is doing its level best. It is greasing Eisenhower more lavishly than any other President has been greased since the foundation of the Republic, but McCarthy has made the climate so hot that the goose-grease melts and runs off faster than it can be applied, even though it is laid on with a trowel.

Symptoms of heat-stroke are beginning to appear among laborers in this field. One newspaper chain has already collapsed into a howling excoriation of McCarthy, and from time to time an individual journal suddenly makes a temporary retirement with sounds suspiciously like gagging; but on the whole the boys are making a noble effort, and if the Administration in November doesn't stand before the electorate with the snowy whiteness of the purest lard it will not be their fault.

Still, it is a heart-breaking task as long as political courage and intelligence seem confined to the one angular figure from Vermont—and he in England, or some other remote fastness in infidel parts.

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Protestant Co-Existence in Illinois

NEARLY 1,600 delegates, accredited visitors and consultants make up the assembly of the World Council of Churches, now meeting on the Northwestern University campus and representing an estimated 170 million Protestant and Eastern Orthodox Christians in 48 nations. When the Council speaks out, consequently, it speaks with an important voice.

Mingled with the conventionally attired Americans and Europeans are the bearded, black-robed Copts with their shiny black turbans, the embroidered head-dresses of the Syrian priests of the Malabar Coast and the long, pastel gowns of Indian women. The colorful Easterners have been holding their peace, leaving the argument on theological and temporal matters to the Americans, the Germans and the Africans.

At the outset, a theological dispute broke out between Americans and Europeans on the theme, "Christ, the Hope of the World." Was the emphasis on "hope" to be placed on the here or the hereafter?

The noted German theologian, Dr. Edmund Schlink, rector of the University of Heidelberg, told the first plenary session of the assembly that the "hope" applies to the end of the world. He believed he saw in the current disorder signs of that "great tribulation" mentioned in the New Testament as the forerunner of the world's end and the birth of the new creation. Although the Christian is obligated to strive for a just society, said Schlink, he can never hope to bring "Christ's Kingdom on earth, nor fashion the new creation."

Schlink's view of eschatology is shared by most of the European theologians, who have seen little in their own lands to support any belief in an imminent breakthrough by the Kingdom of God into man's earthly existence. Most of them seem convinced that from here to eternity is a distance that can never be traveled this side of paradise.

The answer to this was propounded by an American theologian, Dr. Robert L. Calhoun, professor of historical theology at Yale University, who said that in the development of American society theology has stressed the task of redressing injustice on the new industrial and political scene, rather than the notion that man's hope is judgment day.

The views of Schlink and Calhoun set up an interminable series of street corner discussions, the like of which have never been heard around this suburb of Chicago before. Even the hardboiled Chicago press was fascinated by the dispute, and the World Council was muscled off page one only by the assassination of a Chicago hoodlum and adjournment of Congress.

The doctrine of co-existence became another focus of attention. It caused apprehension among delegates from conservative American churches and general rejoicing among the Europeans and the Indians. The theme was presented by Dr. O. Frederick Nolde of the Council's Commission on International Affairs.

Nolde, who is dean of the graduate school of the Lutheran Theological Seminary in Philadelphia, told a plenary session that Western democratic and Soviet cultures must be regarded as dynamic forces which cannot overcome each other without wrecking the planet. "It must be obvious," he said, "that if international issues are not to be settled by war, they must be settled by negotiation." He suggested that a viable form for co-existence was the development of opportunity for the release of these dynamic forces in a peaceful way. One way would be "fruitful competition" in which each would strive to succor the rest of mankind in a race for converts.

To some of the Americans, Nolde sounded alarmingly like a candidate for the witness chair of some investigating committee of Congress. To Europeans and Asians, he sounded like an "old American—the kind you used to have before you became afraid," as an Indian representative put it.

"I did not know," said a French delegate, "such common sense could cause such a stir."

On the eve of the assembly, J. B. Matthews, former agent for Senator McCarthy, showed up on the stage of Chicago's Orchestra Hall to brand the World Council as Communist dupes, mainly on the grounds it was welcoming delegates from behind the Iron Curtain whom Matthews regarded as Red propagandists.

These sinister figures turned out to be a dozen middle-aged preachers from Hungary, Czechoslovakia and East Germany, whose propaganda potential was concealed by the artful manner in which they have avoided the press.

THE MOST outspoken of the group has been Dr. Guenter Jacob of Cottbus in the Russian Zone of Germany, a superintendent of the Evangelical Church, who said, "It is impossible to believe in both our Christian dogma and the Communist dogma."

The figure who has been billed by critics of the World Council as the most sinister of the lot has managed to say nothing to the pursuing press and little to the assembly. He is Bishop John Peter of Hungary, who is said to have once met Stalin. Thus far, his "propaganda" has been confined to the observation that the unity advanced by the Council is having the effect of lessening tension, a remark which no one yet has been able to interpret as subversive.

Evanston, Illinois RICHARD LEWIS

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BOOKS & COMMENT

Malraux and the Image of Man

by Joseph Frank

"WE KNOW that we have not chosen to be born, that we will not choose to die. That we have not chosen our parents. That we can do nothing against time. That between each of us and universal life, there is . . . a sort of crevice. When I say that each man experiences deep within himself the presence of destiny, I mean that he experiences—and almost always *tragically,* at least for certain moments—the world's indifference *vis-à-vis* himself."

These lines are from André Malraux's most recent novel, *Les Noyers de l'Altenburg* (The Walnut Trees of Altenburg); and they go a long way to explain why, of all the French writers famous before the Second World War, Malraux is one of the few to whom the younger generation still pays homage. For this utterance might be used as a condensed summary of the themes that dominate their sensibility; nor has Malraux placed it in the mouth of his character simply to keep abreast of Sartre and Camus. Long before Heidegger and Jaspers had become names that everybody mentions but nobody really reads, the post-war Existentialist atmosphere had been intuited and created by the writer who, in a book published in 1926 (*La Tentation de l'Occident*), had written: "at the center of European man . . . . is an essential absurdity." Not only was God dead, according to Malraux's fictional Chinese observer of Europe, but after God the image of Man was also in the process of becoming extinct.

The advent of an Existentialist mood, therefore, has brought Malraux into the foreground as a prophetic cultural precursor. And it has, at the same time, clarified the essential contours of his creative universe. Malraux's heroes, it is now realized, are not so much engaged in a battle against a particular social and economic form as against the limitations of life itself. To fight a war or revolution they may submit to social discipline; but they never confuse this limited battle with the eternal struggle that can only end in their defeat. The Communists were never too happy about Malraux as an ally, and with good reason. For while he was ready to fight and die with them for the sake of justice and liberty (when it was still possible to use these terms in connection with Communism), their childish social optimism could never blot out his Pascalian vision of *la condition humaine.* And it is this vision which, with tragic grandeur, silhouettes his characters against the lurid blackness of a universe rent by lightning-flashes of death and destruction.

A PREOCCUPATION with such themes, according to one of the most deeply-rooted prejudices of Sunday supplement criticism, is a symptom of morbid decadence. But Heidegger is right in maintaining that the confrontation of death, far from crippling the will, can result in an attitude of heroic "resolution" *(Entschlosseinheit)*; and Malraux's novels, despite their unrelieved grimness, are filled with images of Spartan heroism.

In an early work like *La Voie royale,* this heroism is still that of the individual consciousness defying the blind forces of time and oblivion, and, like Pascal's "thinking reed," proclaiming its sovereignty over inchoate Nature. But in works like *La Condition humaine* (Man's Fate) and *L'Espoir* (Man's Hope), as Emmanuel Mounier has pointed out, this heroism widens into an affirmation of human solidarity. And the silent tenderness of the Spanish peasants in *L'Espoir,* conducting the wounded Loyalist aviators—none of them Spanish—down the Sierra de Teruel in a solemn cortège, has become the most famous and moving image of Malraux's "virile fraternity" of the human.

Les Noyers takes up this theme of fraternity and attempts to project it in universal terms. The manuscript of this novel was, ironically enough, destroyed by the Gestapo during the French debâcle, and only fragments were left to be published in Switzerland in 1943; but these are enough to give us a glimpse into the original plan, and to allow us to hear again the accents of one of the noblest voices of our time. It is a voice which, as Malraux has written, "tries to make men conscious of the grandeur they ignore in themselves"; and this sentence, written in the thirties, recapitulates perfectly the essence of his most recent fiction.

The book is a series of staccato scenes set in the period from the beginning of the century up to the First World War; these are framed between two sections from the time of the second great conflict. The narrator, an Alsatian fighting with the French forces in 1940, is a prisoner in a great camp surrounding the cathedral of Chartres; part of an inert mass of humanity, slowly dissolving back to the primitive. "By what, as a writer, have I been obsessed these past ten years, if not by man? Here I am face-to-face with the original material." Under this stimulus, he begins to narrate the story of his father, Vincent Berger, who had fought with the Germans in 1914 "and who was no older than myself when the mystery of man that obsesses me today began to impose itself on him."

THE FIGURE of Vincent Berger has features taken both from Malraux himself and from T. E. Lawrence, another intellectual turned adventurer and man of action. An early disciple of Nietzsche, and the power behind the throne of the Young Turk rebellion, Vincent Berger is defeated in his dream of uniting all of Central Asia behind the magnetic Turkish dictator Enver Pasha.

The somnolence of an ancient people, sunk in lethargy and refusing to be inspired by an ideal, convert this dream into a grotesque nightmare; and stricken by fever, Vincent Berger returns to Europe. Here, in the port of Marseille, "the state of all-powerful distraction that allows us to live" is broken for him by the shock of strangeness; "this evening . . . he felt himself free—with a poignant liberty indistinguishable from abandon." The world he had left was that of submission to destiny; the world he was entering, that of the anguish of liberty.

This juxtaposition of destiny and

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freedom is the heart of the debate in the next section between scholars of various countries, convoked by Vincent's uncle to the abbey of Altenburg. "Does there exist"—so the question runs—"something given on which the notion of man may be founded . . . ?" The German anthropologist Moellberg (clearly modelled on Frobenius) responds to this with an unconditional negative. Each civilization is self-enclosed and impenetrable; there is not Man but men. On the animal level all men resemble each other; but on this level they are not men. "One may conceive a permanence of man," he says, "but it is a permanence in nothingness." To which the Count Rabaud, Malraux's spokesman, replies: "Something eternal remains in man—in thinking man . . . something I would call his divine portion: his aptitude in questioning the universe. . . ." And in an image that Albert Camus has since made famous, the Count adds: "Sisyphus, too, is eternal."

THERE IS, then, a permanence of man that is not merely negative, a human fraternity that spans the centuries. This "divine portion" is precisely man's freedom to question the universe, to assert himself against the dictates of destiny. And the remaining sections of the book, each in its own way, illustrate moments when this freedom surges into consciousness and, if only for an instant, transform the face of reality.

On an obscure battlefield of the Eastern Front in 1915, Vincent Berger watches one of the first gas attacks of the war. But the German troops, instead of overrunning the Russian positions, stumble back to their own lines with strange burdens: Russian soldiers in the horrible convulsions of strangulation. "Man is not made to be rotted to mould" shouts a German officer to Berger, as he labors back to the first-aid trucks through once-green fields now bleached to a lifeless rot by the gas. And in this instinctive combination of anguish and fraternity before the inhuman, Berger feels that, for a moment, he has been brought face-to-face with an Apocalypse of man, "a mystery that disclosed, not its secret but only its presence, so simple and despotic that every thought linked with it vanished into nothingness. . . ."

A similar revelation comes to Vincent Berger's son, twenty-five years later, after a night of terror in a tank-trap during a French tank attack in Flanders. The dawn reveals an evacuated village, and the simplest signs of life seem a miracle, an apparition. "The world might have been as simple as the sky and the sea." But even more miraculous than the marks of man on this half-destroyed dwelling place is the slow smile of an old peasant woman.

> Half-open doors, linen, barns, the imprints of man, Biblical dawn in which the centuries jostle each other—how all the dazzling mystery of morning deepens into that which flowers on those worn lips. For with a dim smile the mystery of man reappears, and the resurrection of the earth is nothing but a trembling decor.

It is with this apotheosis of man, "as powerful as darkness and as powerful as death," that Malraux concludes his novel.

Les Noyers does not have the dense complexity of *Man's Fate,* with its rapid interweaving of cinematographic vignettes, nor yet the panoramic social sweep of *Man's Hope.* But we know that Malraux abandoned the idea of reconstructing his original novel; and it would only be tedious to dwell on the schematic character of what remains. Even in its skeleton state we can sense the power of its conception, and the fragments, superb in their own right, compel our attention and admiration. No other living writer, with the possible exception of Thomas Mann, could have made the debate at Altenburg so genuine and so exciting. And *Les Noyers* is enriched by a note of poetry, arising from historical images, which Malraux had suppressed since *La Tentation de l'Occident,* and which now returns freed from the juvenile preciosity that marred its first appearance.

A COMPARISON between these two works, indeed, is fruitful for more than stylistic reasons. If, for the youthful Malraux, the image of Man was becoming extinct, the mature Malraux has now dedicated himself to keeping this image alive with all the resources of his magnificent gifts. No one knows better than Malraux how fragile this image is, how powerful the forces are that threaten its destruction; no one is less sentimental and more ruthlessly clear-eyed. But it is precisely this dearly-bought knowledge, paid for in blood, that makes his testimony so precious and so authentic. And the genius of Malraux, before our disbelieving eyes, can still light up the tarnished image of Man with some of the radiance it once had for Shakespeare and Montaigne.

More on McCarthy

OF THE SPATE of books which have appeared, devoted to the life, the character and the activities of Senator McCarthy, this is probably the most useful volume. It will not give the attentive reader of the daily newspapers many facts not previously known. But it marshals the facts exceedingly well; and it estimates McCarthy's activities

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McCarthy and the Communists, by James Rorty and Moshe Decter (Beacon; $2).

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as an anti-Communist with discriminating judgment. The criteria which furnish the norm for the estimate are clearly stated. The authors declare that they are guided by three criteria: They are:

(1) Identify the enemy clearly. The enemy is Communism. Its ranks comprise Communists, pro-Communists, fellow travelers, spies and Communist agents. Its works include infiltration, subversion, and espionage in government and in all other areas of public life.

(2) Pinpoint the enemy unmistakably. The target is Communism. It must not be confused with liberalism, socialism or any other democratic philosophy or program. One must hit the target with the hard facts on infiltration, subversion or espionage.

(3) Expose the enemy persistently and relentlessly. The objective is to eliminate Communism from any role it may have in the conduct of public affairs. One must never stop hammering the facts home. One must pursue the enemy until he is driven out.

The whole volume is devoted to measuring McCarthy's record on the basis of these criteria. He is found wanting. Perhaps the conclusion is a foregone one. But the authors make their investigation a very interesting and informative one. They take up each one of the chapters in McCarthy's anti-Communist activities: the examination of the International Informa-

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tion Center, including the various aspects of its activities; the French desk, the Hebrew broadcasts, the policy adviser of the Information Center, the well known case of Reed Harris; the successful effort to get rid of Theodore Khagan, despite his long and respected anti-Communist record in the HICOG administration of Germany; the Fort Monmouth investigations; the Institute of Pacific Relations investigations; and such minor forays as his charges against Adlai Stevenson, his activities in the Senatorial investigation of the officers involved in the "Malmedy incident" in the Second World War.

In each of these activities the authors analyze the record more carefully than the newspapers which covered them were able to do. They show that McCarthy frequently failed to follow up leads which might lead to actual Communist corruption; that he never "pinpointed" his charges, contenting himself with innuendoes, references upon insufficient evidence and disclosures of youthful indiscretions of now vigorous anti-Communists. They produce the evidence to show that the "targets" of McCarthy's labors varied, but usually did not include the disclosure of actual subversion. Sometimes the target was the Truman Administration. Sometimes it was the Eisenhower government or the present State Department. The thoughtful observer will have suspected the truth of these conclusions; but the volume gives chapter and verse in evidence supporting them.

Despite this indictment the authors do not regard McCarthy as a dangerous "totalitarian" though they show how similar his methods of indiscriminate accusations are to the totalitarian methods of both Communism and Fascism. They think he lacks a sufficiently inclusive program for a totalitarian venture; and both the inclination and the ability to organize a movement.

In view of the widespread European conviction that McCarthyism is but the harbinger of American Fascism, this conclusion is important, if it is sound. Many of us believe it to be sound, though we arrive at it, not merely by analyzing the weaknesses of McCarthy but by observing that the "objective conditions" for Fascism are totally lacking in this country. McCarthyism is undoubtedly a disease on our body politic. The authors do not make the mistake of underestimating its seriousness. But they fortunately do not define it as a disease which might prove fatal to democracy in America. That is a form of indiscriminate judgment which would borrow from the methods of totalitarians for the dubious purpose of awakening the American people to a real danger.

In short this book is a useful tool for every discriminating devotee of democratic institutions.

REINHOLD NIEBUHR

The Flaming Crescent

IN 1919, not a single Moslem state in the world was free of European domination; and less than four decades later, 13 independent states with a mass of over 250 million faithful followers of Mohammed have erupted, while four new African Moslem states tremble in formation. It is this colossal breakthrough of peoples that prompted Alfred A. Knopf, the American publisher, to change the German title of F. W. Fernau's book *Flickering Crescent: Background of Islam Unrest,* to the more provoking *Moslems on the March.* For, though many submerged nationalities may claim the twentieth century, there is strong evidence that even within our lifetime the entire girth of Islam will be free from overseas colonial imperialism, free indeed, ironically, to attempt its own brand of counter imperialism against the Western liberalism which led to its deliverance.

Moslems on the March, by F. W. Fernau (Knopf; $5).

Any serious attempt to evaluate the importance to the world of the rash of new Moslem countries hinges on three basic axes: the domestic conflict of Pan-Islamism with Nationalism; the exterior impact of the Soviet Union; and the economic struggle between the oligarchic feudal families and the rising middle class. Dr. Fernau, an extremely competent social scientist long familiar with the problems of the Near and Middle East, has dissected with brilliance the political problems associated with the rise of modern Islam. Unfortunately, in deliberately narrowing his focus to the political strife, he may have missed the key to the future of the Moslem peoples.

The surface history of modern Islam repeats to an amazing degree that of Europe in the Age of Nationalism. At the end of the Middle Ages, the common people throughout the Christian countries were sentimentally attached to an ideal of united Christendom as expressed in the fiction of the Holy Roman Empire. Differences, however, among the Christian sects, ethnic elements and ambitious heads of local dynasties soon crystallized into a pattern of separate and often antagonistic national states. This process is repeating itself among the Moslems.

At the turn of the last century, as a result of the impact of European ideas on the stagnant Moslem community, two rival group of reformers began to compete for the minds of the Islamic masses. One, preaching Puritan reform and having its principal nests in Egypt and Moslem India, sought its ideal in the original form of the Mohammedan community, the best contemporary example of this wing being the Moslem Brotherhood. The other, which allied itself with modern nationalism and was particularly strong in Turkey, sought a separation of state and religion. Although strong waves of reaction against European secular ideas still sweep through areas of the Moslem world, broadly speaking, the Nationalist elements have been victorious. For Islam is a collective name that holds together peoples as diverse as those in the Christian lands and the force of the anti-national reformers inevitably was dissipated in the criss-cross of intrigues among the disparate Mohammedan areas.

The arc of Islam sweeps from Morocco to Indonesia, the Volga River to the Congo: every race, color, climate and level of political development is included and even in the more homogeneous areas, such as the Arab world, the internal frictions are so great that cohesive policy is all but impossible. Indeed, the nationalists have so influenced the heart of Pan-Islamism, the Arab mother people, that the statutes of formal agreement of the Arab League specifically acknowledge "the principle of the inviolability of the sovereignty of the individual states." The inevitable victory of national ideas over Pan-

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Islamism is no more astounding than the similar result in Europe several centuries earlier. As Dr. Fernau points out, even in the heyday of united Islam, though a line of Caliphs extended down to the Mongol invasion in the middle of the thirteenth century, actually "the unity of the Islamic state had become no more than a fiction long before."

The spread of nationalism does not imply a forward movement for liberal ideas; the Moslem elite merely seized on the concept of the state as a stronger vehicle for regional unity than the supranational doctrine of Islam. Turkey, in fact, the most advanced national state, is viciously racist, whereas the loosely united Arab folk often show an amazing tolerance for divergent viewpoints.

The impact of the Soviet Union on the newly emerging Islamic states, particularly with regard to the vast oil resources of the Persian Gulf, is one of the mysteries the future conceals. Certainly, however, the entire tradition of Islam is alien to Communism. The Soviet condemns the influence of religion, even in the purely spiritual zone, which is a more radical position than that taken by the most progressive Moslems. The cadre nature of the Communist Party is contrary to Islamic thought which, with the possible exception of Shia Persia, dispenses with the system of spiritual intermediaries between revelation and common worship. And it must not be forgotten that, as Dr. Fernau rightly states, though we tend to think of colonial expansion in terms of overseas territories, the Soviet Union is the sole remaining imperialist nation still firmly holding to large Islamic tracts.

Russia pushed steadily on both sides of the Caspian Sea and by the middle of the nineteenth century the Caucasus was entirely in Russian hands. The whole of Turkistan was also carved out of a weak Persia. Khiva and Bukhara became buffer states, eventually absorbed by the Czar. Towards the end of the last century "the Russians had cut out of the Islamic world a colonial empire comparable in size, though not in population, with the British possessions in India." Today, over ten percent of all Moslems live in Soviet territory. The anti-imperialist Mohammedan correctly sees no difference between the extension of the Russian land bulk and overseas domination. As a consequence, the Islamic world is free of fellow-traveling groups and even the Tudeh Party of Persia can hardly be compared to the crypto-Communist forces in Western Europe.

The weakness of separating political from economic movements leads Mr. Fernau to miss perhaps the most significant development in the Moslem world. Whether it be the Young Turks, the Revolutionary Council in Egypt, the Syrian Shishaki dictatorship, the Neo-Destour Party in Tunisia or the Mossadegh rebellion in Persia, the dominant economic fact throughout the Islamic states is that the new nationalism has provoked a major revolt of the lower middle classes, who have infiltrated and taken over the armies, against the millenium-old domination of the landowning and merchant oligarchy.

The political expression of this movement is a jettisoning of the façade of democracy, behind which the feudal forces maintained themselves in power, for a series of dictatorships where the younger elements of the rising middle class control the revolutionary leaders. The situation of the Italian Renaissance is repeated: the dictators bring material progress and arouse the enthusiasm of the intelligentsia; the old form is discredited under its legerdemain of feudal legitimacy. Where this process will stop no one can portend, for Islam is capsuling the slow evolution of Europe in a matter of decades.

Once all Western imperialism is at an end and the Palestine question settled, the inherent social conflict will take a new form. For, released from external pressures, the new middle class, which is now attempting to consolidate its position, will come into combat with the depressed *fellaheen* who likewise are rousing from their centuries of sleep. When the present writer was last in Bagdad, the house boy living outside his room on a mat had one rice meal a week; the other days his meals consisted *solely* of potatoes or cabbage or curry; i.e. potatoes one day, cabbage the next, etc. He went about clad in his entire wardrobe, a pair of undershorts. He could not read or write, like 92 percent of the other Iraquians. And yet it is estimated that the primitive kingdoms of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Iraq, Qater and Bahrein will shortly receive an annual income of one *billion* dollars a year from oil royalties under the new general principle of profit sharing. What will happen to the crumbling forces of traditional Islam when such facts become generally known among the hunger-ridden inchoate mass?

DANIEL M. FRIEDENBERG

Power and the Glory

THE PUBLICATION of George Sundborg's book on the thirty-year struggle for the Grand Coulee Dam is timely.

The struggle he treats as history is still with us. Names and places have changed, slogans are different. But the issue remains the same: shall the people through their government be permitted to convert to their benefit the great wealth inherent in the waters of the Columbia River and its tributaries, or shall this greatest resource of the Pacific Northwest be privately appropriated for the profit of a few utility companies.

Hail Columbia, by George Sundborg (Macmillan; $5.75).

In the days of which Sundborg writes, the fighting words were "Grand Coulee," and "gravity," respectively. Today, they are "Hell's Canyon" on the one hand and "partnership" on the other. Now, as then, the choice is between plentiful low-cost power and economic expansion as against scarce high-cost power and arrested growth.

It took a small group of determined men 30 years to bring about construction of this giant dam on the Columbia. James O'Sullivan, contractor from Michigan, who wouldn't let go even when the struggle seemed hopeless, financially and politically, is the hero of *Hail Columbia.* Against the combined efforts of private utilities and chambers of commerce, O'Sullivan, Rufus Woods and their associates, primarily in Ephrata and Wenatchee, Washington, fought and carried this battle to success. They earned the gratitude not only of the Pacific Northwest for the new industries, farms and homes made possible, but of the whole Nation. Columbia River power from Coulee made possible the Hanford plutonium plant and the production of nearly half of the aluminum output of World War II.

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JUST PUBLISHED—The first study of Senator McCarthy in power

McCarthy and the Communists

By JAMES RORTY and MOSHE DECTER

Research sponsored by the American Committee for Cultural Freedom, an organization of 300 distinguished American scholars, scientists, and cultural leaders, dedicated to providing intellectual leadership in the fight against Communism and all other forms of totalitarianism.

IN all the uproar about McCarthy there has not been a single painstaking, nonpartisan evaluation of the facts, and of the opinions of both the pro and anti-McCarthy camps, from the point of view of the real issue: **how to combat Communism effectively and responsibly.** That gap is now filled as Rorty (a Taft Republican) and Decter (a Stevenson Democrat) *join forces to examine* in detail the most controversial issue in America today.

For those who praise McCarthy's results but question his methods—as well as for McCarthy's opponents—this book will come as a startling eye-opener.

Comments from advance readers:

Reinhold Niebuhr: "A superb contribution to an understanding of a great American problem."

Elmer Davis: "This is the best book about McCarthy that I have read—showing not only what he has done (or tried to do) but what he can't do."

Erwin D. Canham, Editor, Christian Science Monitor: "This book is realistic, fair and devastating. Among its best elements is a practical treatise on how to defeat communism."

Frederick Woltman, Pulitzer Prize-winning Scripps-Howard journalist: "A profound analysis. Will be hated by the Communists—this book shows how Moscow and McCarthy have been of service to each other."

John Cogley, Executive Editor, The Commonweal: "... brilliantly demolishes the phony either-or of both Communists and McCarthyites."

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At all booksellers. 163 pages. For information on organizational quantity orders, write to the publishers.

B·P THE BEACON PRESS
Boston 8, Massachusetts

Sundborg tells how this stubborn group persisted in drawing attention to the tremendous irrigation and power possibilities of the Coulee. Ridiculed as visionaries, they continued to dream of a dam, several hundred feet across the swirling Columbia; of a great pumping plant to lift a vast amount of water another couple of hundred feet to the irrigation canals; of the world's greatest power plant.

The private utility interests wanted to build a gravity project to irrigate the Columbia Basin at far higher cost, so that they wouldn't have on their hands a large power supply, embarrassing to dispose of in this relatively under-developed part of the country.

O'Sullivan called on some of the famous engineers of the day to look at the dam site. Many quickly responded to the challenge to engineering skill and to the vision of the power possibilities. An ancient channel of the river itself would be used to carry the water to the head of the "basin" area with its rich soils, needing only irrigation to produce lush crops. Power could be generated in vast amounts to pump water from the storage reservoir behind the dam to canal headworks and earn revenues to pay for much of the cost of these and other irrigation instalations.

The enthusiasm of the few ultimately took hold; engineering investigations were carried out. But the fight for the project had only just begun in earnest.

During the depression, even the growing popular support did not make up for complete absence of money to finance the fight and even the mere subsistence of O'Sullivan. But the group held on, and as popular support—which slowly filtered through to Washington, D. C., too—made all-out opposition too risky, the adversaries began to retreat. The infamous Kettle Falls episode, in which the Washington Water Power Company sought a permit to build a small dam above Grand Coulee, so that a high dam could not be built, was only one of the obstructive moves. As the advantages of the high dam became overwhelmingly clear, and as the concept of comprehensive river basin development gained acceptance, the Federal Power Commission unceremoniously quashed that diversionary project.

The same kind of fight is now being repeated in Hell's Canyon, Idaho. Again it is necessary to dispel disbelief in the practicability of the high dam. Again the opposition is well organized, well financed. Again the FPC has been asked to license a low dam to prevent construction of the high dam. Again, a small group of men and women, short on money, but long on popular support, are fighting to reach the next milestone in the development of the water resources of the Columbia Basin. Who knows how long this fight will take? Compared with the 30 years' struggle for Grand Coulee its seven-year struggle is in its infancy. Sundborg's book may help to shorten this struggle.

Hail Columbia points up the characteristic short-sightedness of the private utilities: instead of profitably distributing power from a succession of great multiple-purpose dams, they are trying to dismember and to take over piecemeal the whole Federal power system in the Pacific Northwest.

Unfortunately, this is in good part an "inside" job. The present Administration is helping in various ways: (1) by promoting a "partnership" plan without a proper balance of interests, powers and responsibilities among the "partners"; (2) by offering large chunks of the existing and potential system to the private utilities at bargain-basement prices; (3) by refusing to build the new power projects required to permit the Northwest to continue its remarkable growth; and (4) by "reorganizing" the Bonneville Power Administration out of the Government's power business in its essential power planning, management and marketing phases.

Sundborg's book, with its wealth of detail, is exciting reading and provides excellent background reference for battles now in progress in the Pacific Northwest and elsewhere.

K. W. HAMILTON

Notes on the Critics

JOSEPH FRANK is a critic of literature and philosophy. REINHOLD NIEBUHR'S newest book is *Christian Realism and Political Problems*; Dr. Niebuhr is Dean of the Union Theological Seminary. DANIEL M. FRIEDENBERG is a New York businessman who writes frequently on African and Near Eastern subjects. K. W. HAMILTON is a researcher in the field of natural resources.

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CORRESPONDENCE

► Anti-Americanism in Britain

I don't think the article ("The British Press on 'The Yanks'," *NR*, August 23) gets very deep. Almost all its quotations are from the tabloids, and in quoting the Boilermakers' Secretary it does not point out that he is a crypto-Communist. I think you would agree that you don't go for "factual objective reports" to the big circulation tabloids. An anthology of one or two American columnists of the last few years on Britain might be just as illuminating. But the answer here and in the United States is certainly not a Press Council "for rebuking irresponsible journalism and as an agency for promoting better reportage among its members."

What interested me most about the article was its failure to see how much of the criticism is due to mistrust of United States foreign policy. This is not just McCarthy, but Dulles, Knowland and the admirals and generals. Ordinary people can hardly believe that if the eminent are prepared to talk with such bellicosity there is not something behind it. No sooner do we have something saying how peace-loving America is than somebody comes out with some nonsense about a preventive war! The British don't want another war and that explains half the mistrust. McCarthyism, the McCarran Act and all the witch hunting have had a very bad effect especially on the middle classes. You know all this, of course. I do not think there is much we can do about it. We must let things work themselves out.

A. P. WADSWORTH, EDITOR
The Manchester Guardian

► Our Agricultural Surplus

Since subscribing to *NR* I have been reading it with unceasing enthusiasm. Now I read, ("The Tempest over Wallace"), a proposal that the government pay farmers to retire surplus acres from production, into a "soil bank," to reduce excess crops.

On another page Bruce Bliven states, as if not expecting contradiction, that "half the people on this globe live in a continuous state of semi-starvation, and another '20 percent have barely enough food for minimum nutritional requirements."

Lately *Time* inwardly rejoices while describing the worst floods in a generation in China, with consequent prospects of famine.

Why should we not ship our food surpluses to China, as well as India, ship larger quantities to India, help out the Indonesian Republic and dump our food—if dump is the word—not where it will compete with grain from Canada and Australia but where it will help most those who have the least?

If such gifts should be made in token amounts for propaganda—*Time* seems to believe that this is the only purpose of shipping food where it is needed—the effort would be wasted. Our grains, butter, cotton should be sent as free gifts, for free distribution, in amounts too large for graft or misrepresentation, where the starvation need is greatest. They should be sent for use, not thanks, for charity in the full meaning of the word, not propaganda.

PETER YATES
Los Angeles, Calif.

• • •

Will you please stop encouraging another rise in bread prices? I am absolutely opposed to M. W. Thatcher's suggestion (*NR*, Aug. 16) of a further increase in the inflated price of a loaf; it should be decreased at least 4-6 cents! DOWN WITH BREAD PRICES!

MRS. P. CAMMER
Huntington, N. Y.

• • •

Your farm policy is shocking. . . . I am paying over $100 more for feed weekly than I am receiving for the eggs. May I suggest you call your paper *"New Republicans."*

HERMANN LANDAUER
Elmer, N. J.

► Slur on the South

A bumbling official from Washington alienates the whole territory of Alaska and, in the issue (August 16) which announces that fact, a bumbling *NR* editorialist disposes of the character and motivation of two distinguished public servants with the statement that "like most Southerners up from impoverished country, they feel deeply the honor of belonging to the Senate . . ." I have little information on the origins of Stennis of Mississippi but, if you are no more accurate about him than you are about Ervin of North Carolina, you are not to be trusted. If you mean that Mississippi is still economically weak, you are correct. As for North Carolina, I (a frequent visitor) can tell you that it is economically, socially and politically far in advance of many of the Northern states whose eminence in those respects you so casually presume.

MILTON BURTON
Mishawaka, Ind.

BANDWAGON

General Zahedi remarked bitterly that Iran had become so impoverished in the last three years that "there is hardly anything for anyone to steal nowadays, but we trust that the situation will change for the better once the oil revenues begin flowing into our treasury around Oct. 1."
—*New York Times*, August 13, 1954.

THE La Jolla star (Dorothy McGuire) is looking forward to working with Alex Segal, the brilliant director of "Theater Guild," but she hasn't done more than just read the script—an adaptation of Henry James' "Aspirin Papers."
San Diego Evening Tribune, July 9, 1954.

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Teachers

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